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Abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Degree of M.E.P. 
 
NUTRIENT TRADING: A VIABLE SOLUTION TO WATER QUALITY 
MANAGEMENT IN SELWYN DISTRICT? 
 
By Matthew James McGuire Watkins 
 
Water quality is quickly becoming one of the most pressing environmental issues the world 
over. While historically New Zealand has enjoyed a relatively high quality of water, recent 
intensification of land use has resulted in its steady decline. This decline is highlighted 
perhaps no where better than in Selwyn District where all but the mountain rivers exceeded 
guideline values for nutrient enrichment.  
 
This observed state highlights the failure of the current regularity approach to successfully 
manage the tradeoffs between economic development and ecological conservation. Nutrient 
Trading Programs are an innovative approach to water quality management with a 
demonstrated ability to successfully manage these tradeoffs. Despite examples of its 
effectiveness in a number of applications throughout the world, Nutrient Trading Programs 
are not suitable in all circumstances.  
 
This dissertation evaluates the viability of a Nutrient Trading Program as an effective water 
quality management tool in the Selwyn District.  Drawing from a range of evaluation studies, 
it develops a framework of four parameters through which this viability can be determined. 
Applying this framework to Selwyn District it highlights the current state of these 
determinant variables in the district and assess there likely impact on the success of a 
Nutrient Trading Program.   
 
Overall this analysis highlights a strong suitability of a Nutrient Trading Program in Selwyn 
District. Legal, economic and social conditions all appear to be favourable. While the 
biophysical and political conditions of the district highlight some potential challenges, it is 
reasonable to believe that they can be effectively addressed prior to a Nutrient Trading 
Programs implementation. Recommendations are provided to direct these efforts.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem Framing 
Water quality is rapidly becoming one of the most pressing environmental issues facing many 
parts of the world today. While, by international standards, the quality of New Zealand‟s 
freshwater is high (OECD, 2006), it is none the less declining (Ministry for the Environment, 
2007). A 2002 overview of the water quality of the rivers and streams in Canterbury found 
that all but mountain rivers exceeded guideline values for nutrient enrichment (Meredith & 
Hayward, 2002:22). 
 
Water is essential to New Zealand‟s social, cultural, and economic well-being. Environment 
Canterbury‟s Proposed Natural Resources Regional Plan recognizes water resources as 
important for aquatic ecosystems, aesthetic, cultural and recreation values, tourism, and as a 
source of water for drinking, industry and agriculture. This value of water quality is further 
substantiated in a growing public unease. Water quality related issues consistently rank high 
among issues of environmental concern in Canterbury (Cook, 2008), and as the single most 
important environmental issue for New Zealand (Hughey, Kerr & Cullen, 2008:75). 
 
Water pollutants originate from a variety of sources, including agricultural land uses, 
community sewerage schemes, industrial discharges to land, septic tanks and urban runoff. 
According to the Ministry for the Environment (2007:304) water quality is generally poorest 
in rivers and streams in urban and farmed catchments. This reflects the impact of non-point-
sources of pollution in these catchments, such as urban stormwater, animal effluent, or 
fertiliser run-off. While discharges from point-sources remain a significant influence on water 
quality, because these sources are now largely controlled under the Resource Management 
Act 1991, the attention of many resource managers has turned to non-point-source pollution.  
 
Traditionally, approaches to the management of diffuse source pollutants in New Zealand 
have been dominated by principles of command-and-control (CAC).  Such approaches rely 
on regulation, monitoring and the threat of enforcement through penalties to derive a desired 
behaviour from polluters. While, as highlighted above, such approaches have proven to be 
successful in addressing point sources of water pollution, their effectiveness in addressing 
diffuse source of water pollution has often been limited (Selman, Greenhalgh, Branosky, 
Introduction 
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Jones, & Guiling, 2009). Market based instruments (MBIs) offer policy makers some 
innovative tools for water quality management that have the potential to overcome some of 
the problems facing traditional CAC approaches. Targeting environmental outcomes rather 
than the source of pollution, MBIs‟ incorporation of market opportunities and processes offer 
stakeholders the ability to develop and implement their own innovative and economically 
efficient solutions. This not only limits the effects of imperfect information existing between 
the polluter and the regulator, but offers a way to introduce more flexibility and cost effective 
ways of achieving water quality goals (Hatton, Connor & Morrison, 2004:13).  
 
Nutrient Trading Programmes (NTPs) are one type of MBI that are gaining international 
popularity as an effective mechanism to meet water quality goals (Selman et al., 2009:2). 
With a foundation dating back to as early as 1960, there exists a substantial field of 
theoretical understanding of the strengths and weaknesses associated with this approach. Its 
popularity has also allowed for a great deal of practical understandings to be developed 
regarding its design and implementation.  Perhaps most importantly, this experience has also 
demonstrated that NTPs are not an appropriate approach in all circumstances.  
 
1.2 Aim and Objectives 
Aim 
The aim of this research is to contribute to the more effective management of the world‟s 
most essential resource, water. To do this, this dissertation evaluates the potential for a NTP 
as an effective water quality management tool in the Selwyn District of New Zealand. It is 
not the intention of this research to provide a definitive answer regarding the adoption of an 
NTP, but rather to develop a preliminary understanding of its viability from which future 
work regarding its desirability can be directed.  
 
Objectives 
This research has three objectives: 
1. Develop an understanding of the potential benefits of a Nutrient Trading Programme 
to water quality management efforts in Selwyn District.  
2. Establish a set of criteria by which the success of an NTP can be determined.   
3. Use these criteria to assess the viability of an NTP in Selwyn District. 
4. Based on these findings, recommend future policy options in relation to the use of an 
NTP in the Selwyn District.  
Introduction 
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1.3 Structure of Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter two, Method, outlines the research method 
used to inform this dissertaion. It will also discuss the key limitations associated with this 
research and how they were taken into account in the research process.  
 
Chapter three, Theoretical Foundations of Nutrient Trading, provides a theoretical overview 
of NTPs. This section starts with an introduction and analysis of MBIs as a whole, broadly 
highlighting their theoretical underpinnings, key assumptions, strengths and weaknesses. It 
then moves into a more direct exploration of nutrient trading as a water management tool. It 
highlights the reasoning behind its‟ use, as well as compares it to other management 
approaches. 
 
Chapter four, Framework of Assessment, draws on a review of MBI assessment literature to 
introduce the key conditions affecting NTP success in implementation. In doing so it 
establishes the criteria by which the viability of an NTP in Selwyn District will be assessed in 
chapter five, Evaluation of Selwyn District.  
 
Finally, chapter six, Conclusion, draws on this previous analysis to determine the viability of 
an NTP as a water quality management tool in Selwyn District. From this conclusion, 
recommendations are derived as well as some insights regarding potentially useful future 
research directions on the subject. 
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Chapter 2 Method 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the method used in this dissertation. It doing so, it also presents 
the key limitations and discusses how the effects of these were minimized. It 
concludes by outlining the contribution this dissertation is intended to provide current 
understandings in the field.  
 
2.2 Method 
The method used to inform this dissertation was a critical literature review. While all 
information was collected through this method, given the nature of the information 
needed, as well as its availability, the specific form this literature review took varied. 
Figure 2.1 provides a graphical representation of the process through which this 
dissertation is informed. This research was broken down into four stages, each 
directed to meet one of the four objectives.  
 
2.2.1 Stage 1 
Stage 1 of this research develops an understanding of the potential benefits of a NTP 
to water quality management efforts in Selwyn District. This was conducted through a 
critical review of the literature pertaining specifically to the theoretical development 
of NTPs in water quality management. The literature reviewed was gained through a 
suite of journal and catalogue search engines. Google Scholar was also used to find 
works referenced by literature found through library resources but not available 
through the library search engines.  
 
A major limitation associated with this method is its reliance on the validity of the 
work consulted. In order to maintain the highest possible quality of information used, 
this literature review was restricted to peer reviewed work, and established textbooks 
in environmental economics. This ensures that the information used to develop 
understandings in this dissertation have been previously evaluated with a degree of 
academic rigor. Furthermore, in order to verify the accurate interpretation of critical 
works, where possible, commonly cited ideas were traced back to the original source.  
 
Method 
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Figure 2.1 Graphical Representation of Research Approach 
 
2.2.2 Stage 2 
Stage two of this research establishes the set of criteria by which the likely success of 
NTP implementation can be determined. Similar to stage one, this was conducted 
through a critical literature review, however unlike stage one which was based on 
theoretically focused literature, stage two reviewed literature pertaining to the 
practical implementation of MBIs. As a result of the more experimental nature of 
these understandings, while this stage does draw on peer-reviewed works, unlike 
stage one, it also draws on a range of grey literatures.  
 
Again, a major limitation of this method is its dependence on the accuracy of 
literature consulted. While stage one was able to manage this limitation through the 
reliance on peer reviewed works, the incorporation of grey literature in this stage 
decreases certainty of the accuracy of the findings presented within the literature 
consulted. However, while not academically peer reviewed, the grey literature used in 
this stage was drawn from sources that underwent an institutionally peer-reviewed 
process such as those that exist at CSIRO, Motu, the Treasury, the Ministry for the 
Environment, AgResearch, and the World Resource Institute.  
 
STAGE 1 
STAGE 2 
STAGE 3 
STAGE 4 
  STAGE         OBJECTIVE          OUTPUT          METHOD 
Develop an understanding of 
the potential benefits of a 
Nutrient Trading Programme 
to water quality management 
efforts in Selwyn District. 
 
Establish a set of criteria by 
which the likely success of 
NTP implementation can be 
determined. 
Use criteria developed in 
STAGE 2 to assess the 
viability of an NTP in Selwyn 
District. 
 
Discuss significance of 
findings in STAGE 3 and 
recommend future policy 
options in relation to the use of 
an NTP in Selwyn District. 
 
Theoretical 
Foundations of 
NTPs 
Framework of 
Assessment 
Desktop review 
of economic 
literature  
Desktop review 
of MBI 
assesment 
literarure  
Desktop 
literature review 
of relevant fields 
Evaluation of 
Selwyn 
Catchment 
 
Conclusions & Recommendations 
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A second limitation in stage two‟s method is the time lag that exists between 
understandings developed and its appearance in literature.  This time lag can result in 
a discrepancy between understandings found in the field and understandings found in 
the literature.  Fortunately, as a result of the current popularity around the world of 
NTPs in water quality management, as well as their current application in New 
Zealand, the impacts of this limitation were mitigated by the abundance of relevant 
and recent work in the field.   
 
2.2.3 Stage 3 
Stage three of this research evaluates the current state of Selwyn District with regard 
to the assessment criteria developed in stage two. Similar to previous stages, this was 
conducted through a critical literature review, however, unlike previous stages, this 
review included a wider scope of literature. This included not just literature pertaining 
to NTPs, but those pertaining to the critical factors developed in stage two including 
literature in biophysical sciences, economic, and political sciences. While covering a 
wider range of disciplines, the literature reviewed was once again limited to a mix of 
academically peer review and institutionally reviewed grey work. 
 
The major limitation in this stage of research is the range of technical fields it covers. 
While the use of secondary work presented a limitation in previous stages, in this 
stage the use of secondary work is a benefit as it allows for understandings to be 
drawn from experts in the relevant fields rather than trying to build these 
understandings through primary data. That being said, it still requires the successful 
navigation of the literature in these fields as well as the proper interpretation of their 
findings.  
 
2.3  Summary 
The aim of this research is not to provide a definitive answer regarding the adoption 
of an NTP, but rather to develop a preliminary understanding of the critical factors 
likely to affect its viability, and to provide some initial analysis from which the 
appropriate direction of further in-depth research can be derived.  In this context, the 
measures taken to address the above-mentioned limitations are therefore deemed 
appropriate and effective.  
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Foundations of Nutrient Trading  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Increasingly markets are being proposed as mechanisms to help address issues in natural 
resource management. The unique benefits MBIs offer policy makers have led, not only, 
to their increased use world wide, but also to their application to a growing number of 
resource management issues. NTPs are one type of MBI gaining considerable popularity 
in water quality management. In order to better understand the potential role that NTPs 
can play in water quality management in Selwyn District, this chapter will explore the 
economic principles on which they are founded, and discus NTP‟s key benefits and 
limitations in reference to alternative policies in water quality management.  
 
3.2 Market Failure  
An allocatively efficient distribution of resources is one in which society‟s welfare as a 
whole is maximized. The “first theorem of welfare economics” proposes that, provided 
the existence of certain conditions, allocative efficiency can be realized through private 
markets on their own, with no interference from government (Fullerton & Stavins, 
1998:433). In other words, given the initial income distribution, it is believed that the 
individual‟s expression of preferences through the market, both in supply and demand, 
will result in a distribution of resources that will maximize not only their personal 
welfare, but that of society as a whole. This expression of the rational individual‟s 
expression of self interest is what Adam Smith (1759) first referred to as ‘the invisible 
hand’.  Figure 3.1 is a basic graphical representation of such an invisible hand at work, 
illustrating the net social surplus, highlighted in green, that is believed to result from such 
a voluntary market exchange.  
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Figure 3.1 Neo-classical Net Social Surplus 
 
When applied to the provision of environmental goods and services, the invisible hand 
often fails to arrive at such efficient outcomes. This failure is ultimately a product of 
misrepresentation of the true value of goods and services within the market. As a result, 
the privately optimal decision deviates from that of socially optimal, as the true value of 
decisions are not reflected in the market exchange, leading to non-optimal allocation of 
resources (Asafu-Adjaye, 2000:64). Figure 3.2 provides a graphical representation of a 
market allocation with and without considering pollution and its effects on net social 
surplus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Market Allocation with Pollution 
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Using dairy farming as an example, this graph shows the demand for milk in the demand 
curve D, the dairy farmers‟ marginal cost of production, marginal private costs (MCp), 
and society‟s marginal costs of this dairy production, marginal social cost (MCs).  
Because the dairy farmer does not bear all the cost of the pollution their production 
process creates, they have no financial incentive to internalize those cost into their 
decision making. As a result they will choose to produce a quantity of goods where their 
profits are maximized, Qm. However that choice is not socially efficient. Because society 
bears the cost of the pollution created in the production process, for example, through 
reduced water quality society‟s optimal production output would be Q*. The red 
highlighted triangle area is the dead weight loss to society at a production level of Qm 
(Turner, Pearce & Bateman, 1994:23-24). 
 
This failure to appropriately internalise the true costs or benefits of an exchange is known 
as an externality. Within the economic literature there is a pervasive belief that the cause 
of many externalities, particularly with respect to pollution, can be traced to the open 
access of natural resources (Turner et al., 1994:26). Open access resources lack property 
rights which are essential to provide incentives for individuals to restrict their use of 
them. In the case of water pollution, this resource is the ecosystem‟s assimilative 
capacity. As long as polluters stand to gain from exploiting this resource, it will be at risk 
of being overused.  
 
There are three principle means by which governments can intervene in an attempt to 
remedy a market failure. These are outlined in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Options for intervention to address market failures 
Means Description 
Facilitative Measures designed to improve the flow of information and 
corresponding signals and incentives without providing any 
direct incentive payments. 
Incentive Measures designed to directly alter the structure of pay-offs to 
agents and are usually specifically intended to substitute price 
signals that are generated within markets for other goods and 
services. 
Coercive Non-voluntary measures designed to compel management 
change using the coercive powers of government.  
Source: Hatton et al. (2005) 
Theoretical Foundations of Nutrient Trading 
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3.3 Command-and-Control 
Traditionally, governments have used regulatory instruments to address these market 
failures (OECD, 1989:23). Known as a Command-and-Control (CAC) approach, these 
regulations use the threat of sanctions to coerce polluters into the adoption of specific 
technologies or management practices that are thought to lead to a desired outcome 
(Nguyen, Woodward, Matlock, Denzer & Selman, 2006:2-3). CAC have two 
components: first, a regulation which places a restriction on certain behaviour; and 
second a set of penalties which are allocated for non compliance. In the instance of 
addressing point sources of pollution, for example, industrial air emissions, the CAC 
approach has proven to be very effective (Nguyen et al., 2006:6).  
 
There are several reasons for the prevalence of the CAC approach to dealing with water 
pollution. For one, the CAC approach allows governments to set specific targets. 
Although the competition by rent seekers within any market might be able to skew the 
specific target set by government, theoretically, this ability of governments to establish a 
desired outcome gives them the opportunity to take into consideration a wide range of 
economic, social and cultural variables, and establish a target with a relatively high social 
net benefit (Turner et al., 1994:190). 
 
Secondly, regulations are a relatively straight forward process for governments to achieve 
desired outcomes (OECD, 1989:24). CAC approaches establish measurable requirements, 
such as the adoption of specific technologies or best management practices, and therefore 
offer a clear process through which desired outcomes can be sought. They also establish a 
clear process through which these requirements are monitored and enforced and can cater 
penalties to ensure the desired level of compliance.  
 
Despite these potential benefits, CAC approaches do have several key limitations as 
pollution control policy instruments. To start, as Stavins (1998) points out, CAC 
approaches can have a negative impact on the development of environmentally beneficial 
technologies and production methods. Because they use the threat of punishment rather 
than the encouragement of reward, they offer little incentive for polluters to seek 
Theoretical Foundations of Nutrient Trading 
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pollution reduction opportunities beyond the targets specified in the regulation. 
Furthermore, CAC approaches often prescribe the specific technologies that must be 
adopted. As a result they not only limit the adoption of existing technologies, but more 
importantly, they stifle the innovation of new, more effective, technologies (Stavins, 
1998:2). 
 
Also, as a review of CAC approaches to pollution control conducted by Nguyen et al. 
(2006:6) found, CAC approaches are not cost effective. The main reason for this is that, 
by and large, CAC approaches place the same emissions requirements on all sources of 
pollution relevant to the target they are trying to meet. While the equal division of this 
target amongst the various sources of pollutions might seem to be an equitable approach, 
by regulating requirements at the individual or firm level instead of at the aggregate level, 
the CAC approach fails to take advantage of the emissions cost heterogeneity existing 
between the various sources of pollution. As a result the CAC approach costs the 
economy as a whole more by not encouraging most emission reductions to flow from the 
least cost sources (Nguyen et al., 2006:3).  
 
Finally, CAC approaches are often politically unpopular because of the costs they impose 
on polluters and because of the lack of flexibility that they afford polluters. As a result of 
this, CAC approaches often require a high level of political will to not only be enforced, 
but implemented in the first place (Turner et al., 1994:192). Ultimately this leads to a 
reduced likelihood of achieving a desired outcome, in this case, improved level of water 
quality.  
 
As Tietenberg (1986) summarizes, these limitations are ultimately the result of the failure 
of the CAC approach to match capabilities with responsibilities. As a result, regulatory 
authorities responsible for setting a target and delineating a means of achieving it, have 
too little information available to them to do this cost effectively. However, those that do 
have this information, the polluters, lack the incentive necessary to voluntarily accept 
their cost effective responsibility or disclose unbiased cost information to regulators so 
that it can make a cost-effective assignment. 
Theoretical Foundations of Nutrient Trading 
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3.4 Market Based Instruments 
MBIs are policy tools that use the market as a means to encourage the behaviour 
necessary to meet a desired environmental outcome (Stavins, 1998:1). By harnessing the 
power of the market, MBIs employ aspects of both facilitative and incentive based 
measures, rather than the explicit coercion employed by CAC approaches. By changing 
incentive structures associated with a particular behaviour, MBIs seek to align private 
and social benefits so that the best private choice can be made to coincide with the best 
social choice (Tietenberg, 1990:17). Figure 3.3 outlines the two principal ways in which 
MBIs do this with respect to pollution control. 
 
Market-based Instruments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Types of Market-based Instruments  
Source: Whitten, Van Bueren, & Collins (2004) 
 
3.4.1 Price-based approach 
The price-based approach goes back to the early 1920s when Pigou first conceived of the 
potential use of taxes and subsidies to recalibrate differences found between private and 
public costs (Paragahawewa, 2006:1). Supported more recently by Haas (1970), and 
Baumol and Oates (1972), the price-based approach argues that governments should 
impose taxes to reach the price which yields the desired levels of pollution. This would 
be done by setting a tax equal to marginal externality at the optimum, which would have 
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the effect of creating a post-tax profit that is maximized at the optimal level of pollution. 
Figure 3.4 provides a graphical representation of this tax.  
Figure 3.4 Pigovian Tax 
 
The MNPB curve represents the marginal net private benefit function of the polluter. 
MEC curve represents the marginal external costs function, in other words the marginal 
damage suffered by society. Without government intervention, the polluter would 
produce until Qp, where their MNPB equalled zero. The tax effectively increases the 
costs of production, reducing the MNPB curve to MNPB-TAX. At efficiency, this tax is 
set to a level where it adjusts MNPB to equal zero at the social optimal level of 
production, Q*, as is represented in the graph.  
 
The revenue this approach generates is one significant benefit of this approach for the 
regulators. Unlike the CAC approach that only collects revenue through fines for non 
compliance, this form of a price-based approach is continually collecting revenue from 
polluters as long as their emissions are above zero. While regulators might appreciate this 
increased revenue, there are some critical limitations in the price-based approaches‟ 
ability to distribute these gains to society as a whole.  
 
In order for this approach to reach allocative efficiency, Q*, it would require individual 
tax rates to be applied at the firm level. In this respect it is similar to the limitations of 
CAC approaches. This cost of firm level administration would erode the gains the tax 
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achieved by driving up transactions costs (Tietenberg, 1973:202). As highlighted 
previously, regulators are not in a position to know the external cost functions of firms 
and are therefore unlikely to identify the optimum tax rate of Q*. If they were, it would 
only be through a series of successive approximations whose recalibration with every 
change in market variables would, once again, erode any gains in efficiency that may 
have been achieved (Carter, 2001:298-299).  
 
3.4.2 Rights-based approach 
Coase (1960) introduced the rights-based approach by suggesting that creation of markets 
in the externalities themselves as a means of addressing their effects on net social surplus 
(Turner et al., 1994:152). Mishan (1967) and Dales (1968) built on Coase‟s hypothesis by 
proposing that a price based system be used to allocate such externality rights through an 
artificial market. In such a market, the right to pollute would be traded between the 
sufferer and the polluter. Through this exchange, in accordance with the ‘first theorem of 
welfare economics’ outlined above, the market would reach an allocatively efficient 
distribution, in this case, resulting in the socially optimal level of pollution. Table 3.2 
outlines the four main characteristics of efficient property rights structures that would be 
needed for such a market to function. 
Table 3.2 Property rights characteristics 
Characteristic Description 
Universality All resources are privately owned and all entitlements are completely 
specified. 
Exclusivity All benefits and costs accrued using the resources accrue to the owner, 
either directly or indirectly by sale to others. 
Transferability All property rights are transferable from one owner to another in a 
voluntary exchange. 
Enforceability Property rights are secure from involuntary seizure or encroachment 
by others.   
Source: Tientenberg (1986) 
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Figure 3.5 provides a graphical illustrates of such a transaction.  
Figure 3.5 Coase curve 
The MNPB curve, as noted previously, represents the marginal net private benefit 
function of the polluter and the MEC curve representing the marginal external costs 
function, in other words the marginal damage suffered by society. The efficient solution 
is given at the intersection of MNPB and MEC. Coase predicted that under a rights based 
system, this point of equilibrium would emerge because at a quantity of pollution greater 
than Q*, the sufferer would be willing to pay more to stop pollution than the polluter 
would be gaining from their production of the pollution. Vice versa, at any point lower 
than Q*, the cost of the pollution to society would not be significant enough for it to be 
willing to offset the benefits gained by the polluter through production. If correct this 
approach implies a minimal need for government intervention in environmental 
problems.  
 
In reality such a market in externalities faces a key problem of complexity. As a result of 
the pervasiveness of externalities throughout all economic activity, there would be too 
much information for such a mechanism to process efficiently. Either the costs of 
collecting the information would limit any gains it may achieve or due to a lack of all 
required information the market will be plagued with imperfectly informed transactions. 
The result of either of these two effects makes an economy wide application of such an 
approach infeasible (Atkinson & Tietenberg, 1991:18). 
 
Qp Q* Q0 
Benefits 
costs 
MEC 
MNPB 
Output level 
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The limitations in these two MBI approaches highlight a growing sentiment among 
economists that the amount of information required for a free market to establish the 
optimal level of pollution, likely exceeds what can realistically be collected and used. 
However, while this evidence suggests that the setting of desired levels of pollution 
should be a matter of collective decision making through the political process, rather than 
left to the market itself, once the decision is made about desired pollution levels, 
economics has a great deal to say about how this pollution level is allocated among 
competing users (Tietenberg, 1973:193-194). 
 
3.5 Nutrient Trading Programmes 
NTPs are one form of rights-based MBI that are gaining popularity as an effective means 
of achieving water quality targets. While there can be much variance in the specific 
design of NTPs, all share three common attributes. First, all require that a „cap‟, or target, 
be first placed on pollution levels of a specific body of water. Second, permits, the 
aggregate of which equal the specified target, must be allocated amongst the relevant 
actors that are contributing to the pollution levels of that body of water. Finally, a 
mechanism for exchange must be developed through which actors can trade those rights 
to pollute, creating a market for their exchange (Paragahawewa, 2007:1).  
 
Emissions Trading Schemes (ETSs), from which NTPs are derived, were first used to 
address SO2 and NO2 emission, as part of the Environmental Protection Agency efforts to 
address acid rain in the United States (Nguyen et al., 2006:5; Atkinson & Tietenberg, 
1990:17). This policy followed its successful predecessor which required new sources of 
pollution to acquire offset emission permits from existing emitters. Until this offset 
scheme, which was designed to reduce conflict between air-quality improvements and 
economic growth, the emission trading scheme was designed to increase the costs 
effectiveness of the regulatory policy controlling existing sources of air pollution 
(Atkinson & Tietenberg, 1990:17-18).  
 
While NTPs can be applied to a range of water pollutants including temperature, 
selenium, and sediment, it is most commonly applied to nutrients such as nitrogen and 
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phosphorus (Selman et al., 2009:2). NTPs can also be designed to address the specific 
sources of pollution within a given catchment depending on the nature of the water 
quality problem.  
 
Currently, theree are 57 examples of NTPs worldwide, spread throughout Canada, the 
United States, Australia as well as two here in New Zealand (Selman et al., 2009:1). 
Table 3.3 provides a breakdown of the basic requirements of all NTP programs.  
Table 3.3 Critical elements of a NTP approach to water quality management 
Element Discription 
Public water quality 
goals 
Set by national, district or local authorities based on public input 
and can be defined in terms of ecological, recreational or safety 
standards. 
Pollution cap for a 
watershed 
Limit on the total pollutant load from all sources to a water 
body. The justification for and size of the cap is based on the 
public water quality goals.  
Regulated baseline  Numeric level of pollutant load allowed for at a particular point 
in time.  
Unregulated baseline 
for agricultural non 
point sources 
Minimum level of pollution abatement that an unregulated 
agricultural operation must achieve before it can participate in a 
trading program. Sometimes called a threshold. 
Credits Units of goods (pollution reduction) to be traded in the water 
quality credit market. Credits are generated for every unit of 
pollution reduction beyond the baseline level. 
Sellers (credit 
suppliers) 
Dischargers that reduce pollution below the baseline and 
generate credits for sale in the market. Credits can also be sold 
by intermediaries, as allowed by program rules. 
Buyers (demanders 
for credits) 
Dischargers with regulated baselines for whom pollution 
reduction is expensive. For these sources, it is less costly to buy 
pollution credits from other parties and use these credits to help 
achieve their baseline loads. Credits can also be purchased by 
intermediaries and third parties, as allowed by program rules. 
Trading ration Number of load reduction credits from one source that can be 
used to compensate excessive loads from another source. 
Regulator Entity that determines the water quality goals, establishes caps 
for pollutants in watershed, approves and administers the trading 
program and monitors and enforces the rules.  
Source: Abdalla, Borisova, Parker & Blunk, (2009) 
 
A well-designed and operating NTP program can offer policy makers a number of 
economic, ecological, and even political benefits. To start, NTPs have been 
demonstrated to be very resource cost effective instruments in pollution control. A 
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resource cost effective policy is one which is able to equalize the marginal cost amongst 
firms to meet an aggregate target (Stavins, 1998:1). In other words, it is able to achieve 
the desired pollution target with the last unit of pollution reduction being equal across all 
emitters (Nguyen et al., 2006:3-2). As demonstrated previously by the Coase analysis, 
allowing the free trade of pollution rights takes advantage of the abatement cost 
heterogeneity found amongst firms, allowing pollution targets to be met at the lowest 
aggregate resource cost to the economy. In watersheds, where the cost of non-point 
source pollution abatement can be up to 65 times cheaper than that of point sources, these 
costs savings can be significant (Bacon, 1992, as cited by Nguyen et al., 2006:4).  
 
The overall costs effectiveness of NTPs is further enhanced by the comparatively low 
transaction costs associated with their implementation. Unlike the rights-based 
approach discussed previously, because NTPs are targeted to a specific externality, 
in this case nutrient pollution, the information requirements, and therefore the 
transaction costs associated with information gathering, are much more limited. 
Secondly, by allowing firms the flexibility to seek their own methods of achieving 
targets, NTPs creates a means of revealing firm level pollution abatement costs 
information that other approaches could only achieve through cost intensive firm level 
research (Hatton et al., 2004:17). Finally, growing innovation in the way that markets 
are set up have been proven to greatly reduce the transaction costs associated with 
market friction by increasing the ease with which buyers and sellers conduct 
transactions. NutrientNet, set up by the World Resource Institute to function as a 
clearing house for pollution rights trading in the United States is but one example 
(Selman et al., 2009:14). While the issue of pollution monitoring remains an important 
administrative cost of NTPs, because it is a common costs to all pollution reduction 
approaches, it should not be considered a critical cost. 
 
As Kerr, Lauder and Fairman (2007) point out, there are also several potential political 
benefits associated with the NTP approach. As NTPs are less prescriptive than CAC 
approaches they afford polluters considerable flexibility in the way that they achieve their 
target. NTPs have proven to be more politically acceptable than the prescriptive measures 
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of CAC approaches by allowing decision around such things as land use, technologies 
used, and management practices to remain in the control of the land owner. In addition, 
the flexibility of how the costs of achieving a target are spread within NTPs allows the 
regulating body the opportunity to structure allocations in a way that compensates 
vulnerable groups, helping them adjust and thereby reducing opposition to the policy 
(Kerr et al., 2007:4). There will also be diverse representation of the community, 
including Maori, amongst the owners of pollution permits, and because of the direct 
participation that permit holders have in the way that targets are met, NTPs offers a 
higher level of community engagement in the pollution control process, thereby 
increasing its legitimacy (Kerr et al., 2007:5).  
 
NTPs can also offer considerable ecological benefits over other pollution control 
approaches. To start, because of the potential revenue to be gained through the sale of 
discharge permits, there is a positive economic incentive to adopt and innovate abatement 
technologies and best practices. Furthermore, because there is no individual limit as to 
how much one can gain from pollution reductions, there is no invisible floor to this 
innovation. Finally, because NTSs do not prescribe firm level outputs, they do not impose 
burdensome investments on those polluters with particularly high abatement costs. By 
allowing for the purchase of credits in the market, NTSs offers these firms less capital 
intensive means of meeting their requirements, and therefore reduce the likelihood of 
their non-compliance (Kerr et al., 2007:5). All of these features have the potential to 
contribute to improved ecological outcomes. 
 
Despite the benefits of NTPs, they are none the less subject to their own set of 
limitations. For one, NTPs are limited in their ability to deal with the spatial effects of 
pollution. By setting one pollution target and allowing for the trade of pollution rights 
between all polluters contributing that specified pollution load in a defined geophysical 
area, it does not take into account the localized effects of concentrated pollution. These 
„hot spots‟ may not affect the aggregate target, however, they can have considerable 
localized effects. For example, if in the Selwyn catchment a pollution target was set for 
Lake Ellesmere, it would not restrict where the contributing pollutants originate from. As 
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a result, through the course of pollution permit trading, it is possible that quantities of the 
allocated rights become so concentrated in one area up stream as to have localised 
negative ecological, social and economic effects without breaching the aggregate target. 
While there is growing research on how such special considerations can be integrated in 
to NTP policy, it none the less remains a considerable shortfall of the NTP approach.   
 
Secondly, unlike the claims of other MBI approaches, NTPs are not likely to achieve an 
economically efficient level of pollution. That is to say, there will likely be room to yield 
greater net social benefits than those derived from an NTS (Nguyen et al., 2006:3). 
Unlike the price-based approaches discussed previously, while NTPs use the market to 
distribute pollution rights, they do not use the market to determine the number of rights 
that exist. Instead, this target is set through a political process, that for the same reasons 
outlined in the CAC limitations, is unlikely to be set at Q*, the social optimal level of 
pollution. Under this approach, the exchange does not occur between a polluter and a 
sufferer, but because of the publically imposed cap, trade only occurs amongst the 
various polluters themselves.  
 
Finally, the most significant limitation to the NTPs approach, and all MBIs in general, is 
the deviation that exists between their theoretical roots and their practical applications. It 
is often the case that the assumptions made within the theoretical construction and 
justification to these policies are not realized in their application. In practice, NTPs 
encounter implementation realities that can either be ignored or glossed over in the 
theoretical discourse. As a result, any application of an NTP requires considerable insight 
into the local context.   
 
3.6 Summary 
Nutrient Trading Programmes are an emerging innovation in the way water quality is 
managed. By harnessing the power of the market they are able to achieve several 
economic, political and even ecological benefits. Furthermore, their growing application 
around the world offers policy makers considerable insights into their effective design 
and application. Despite these benefits, NTPs are not a viable policy instrument in all 
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circumstances. There are a number of factors which have considerable impact on their 
ability to achieve the benefits discussed above. The next chapter will survey the most 
critical of these factors and establish a framework by which to evaluate the viability of 
NPS in Selwyn District in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 will discus the findings and offer ways 
forward.   
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Chapter 4 Framework of Assessment   
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter brings together the findings from a number of Water Quality Trading 
evaluation studies and establishes four key categories of conditions critical to NTP 
success. Understanding these conditions and their effects on NTPs is essential to 
effectively evaluating the viability of an NTP as a water quality management policy in 
Selwyn District.  In principle, as outlined in the previous chapter, establishing a NTP is a 
three step process involving setting an overall cap on pollution, allocating portions of that 
cap as emission permits, and allowing the trading of those permits amongst polluters 
(King, 2005:72). However, as with all markets, the efficiency and effectiveness of 
markets in environmental assimilative capacities are dependent on a certain set of 
conditions.  This has been evident since the earliest application of an NTP on the Fox 
River in Wisconsin failed to give rise to a single emissions credit trade in its 14 years in 
operation (Woodward, Kaiser & Wicks, 2002:977).  
   
4.2 Institutional and legal  
The success of any policy is critically dependent on its ability to operate within the 
existing institutional and legal framework. This need is compounded with regard to NTPs 
as the institutional framework is critical to creating the appropriate incentive for polluters 
to use the market mechanism as a least cost means to manage pollution (Selman et al., 
2009:2). There are three institutional conditions that have been shown to be important in 
ensuring this incentive.  
   
First, as Guerin (2004) points out, a key consideration in designing any use rights system 
is the extent to which it is accommodated under the existing legal frameworks. The 
incentive associated with NTP trading is critically dependent on the legal systems‟ ability 
to adequately define property rights to discharge pollution, which outlines the rights, 
privileges, and limitations associated with their ownership.  The legal structure is also 
critical to the policy‟s ability to effectively set a water quality target, which creates the 
scarcity needed to give these property rights the value necessary for a market to form. 
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Woodward et al. (2002) point out that this consideration is particularly important with 
regards to NTPs as the goods which are being exchanged in the market, i.e. the right to 
emit pollution have little meaning, or value, outside of this legal context. Thus without a 
clear and robust legal framework, the value of, and intern demand for, pollution credits 
will likely be limited. 
   
The division of organisational jurisdiction is a second important institutional factor 
affecting the viability of NTPs. Organisational jurisdiction determines not only who has 
the authority to implement an NTP, but more importantly who is responsible for the 
various facets of its operation, such as monitoring and enforcement.  As King (2005) 
points out, the increased complexity associated with such division of responsibilities 
between various organisations at several levels of government can have considerable 
impact on the success of NTPs. This complexity can not only reduce the communication 
needed for effective coordination, it can lead to a blurring of the lines of responsibility. 
As a result, critical components of the policy may fail to be owned by any one level of 
jurisdiction and therefore fail to be adequately implemented.  
   
A final important institutional condition is the capacity of the relevant organisations to 
effectively monitor and enforce the program.  As King (2005) highlights, the importance 
of this capacity is a product of the fact that there is no “natural” demand in regulation-
driven markets such as an NTP, rather demand is dependent on the monitoring and 
enforcement of the market defining regulations.  This capacity is not only dependent on 
resources, particularly funding, but as Sharp (2002) points out, is also dependent on the 
scientific and technical expertise of the regulating authorities.  Without the appropriate 
capacity the policy will struggle to be appropriately monitored and enforced, reducing its 
viability as a functioning market. As Guerin (2004) highlights, it is easy to underestimate 
the resourcing requirements to support such a legally enforceable system. It is important, 
therefore, that such institutional limits are recognised and properly accounted for in the 
evaluation of an NTP‟s viability.  
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4.3 Economic  
Along with institutional conditions, economic conditions also play an important role in 
determining the level of demand for emission permits (Selman et al., 2009:2; King, 
2005:71).  In this case rather than the negative incentive of regulatory enforcement, 
economic conditions determine the level of positive incentive in the form of potential 
financial gains. There are three key factors affecting the potential for economic gains in 
NTPs.  
   
First, heterogeneity in abatement cost must exist amongst polluters in order for the 
exchange of emissions credits to develop.  Abatement costs are affected by variations in 
production inputs, such as available pasture land area and stocking as well as a variation 
in the potential management strategies, such as stand-off pads and riparian margins 
(Kampas & White, 2003:220).  This heterogeneity is critical to NTP success as it creates 
the opportunity needed for there to be economic gains from the trade of emissions credits 
between polluters (Abdalla et al., 2007:220).  If there is not sufficient abatement costs 
heterogeneity within a catchment, there is unlikely to be any trading of emissions 
permits, as the cost for a polluter to buy a permit to offset their emissions, would equal 
the cost for them to reduce their own emissions.  As not all watersheds will have polluters 
with sufficient cost heterogeneity, it is important that the composition of polluters be 
carefully considered prior to the implementation of a NTP.  
   
A second important economic characteristic is the size of the emissions credit market.  In 
this case, the size of the market refers to the number of polluters included in the 
program.   While costs heterogeneity is needed to motivate the exchange of emissions 
permits, market size is needed to allow this exchange to occur.  In thin markets, where 
there are a small number of polluters, there will be few opportunities for those motivated 
to sell permits to find those motivated to buy them (Turner et al., 1994:23).  This reduced 
opportunity not only decreases the competitiveness of the market thereby decreasing the 
efficiency gains of trade, it can actually prevent trades from occurring in the first place. 
As with abatement costs heterogeneity, not all watersheds will exhibit a thick enough 
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market to successfully support an NTP approach, therefore a survey of likely market 
participants needs to be conducted as part of a viability assessment.   
   
Transaction costs are a final economic consideration.  Transaction costs are the costs 
associated with participating in the market, including everything from finding someone to 
trade with to undertaking verification of the terms of trade (Turner et al., 1994:153).  As 
Turner et al. (1994:153) highlight, despite often being left out of theoretical analysis, 
transaction costs play an important role in determining the level of economic gains a 
market can achieve.  While there might exist adequate abatement costs heterogeneity for 
gains to be made through trade, those gains have the potential to be offset by high 
transaction costs, reducing the incentive to participate in the market (Selman et al., 
2009:2).  While all markets will incur some level of transaction costs, they can be limited 
through the way the market is structured (Woodward & Kaiser, 2002:374).  It is 
important for NTP success that there be local mechanisms that allow for the market to be 
structured in such a way as to keep such costs to a minimum.  
   
4.4 Biophysical  
The success of any water quality policy is dependent on its ability to accurately account 
for the interaction of relevant biophysical and ecological dynamics. A failure to do so 
jeopardizes the policy objective, regardless of its successful implementation.  In the case 
of NTPs, there are two particular biophysical dynamics whose uncertainty can jeopardize 
the viability of the instrument.  
   
First, because NTPs use proxies rather than direct measurements to determine non-point 
source levels of pollution, their success is particularly dependent on effectively capturing 
biophysical cause and effect relationships associated with nutrient loss (Selman et al., 
2009:13). Without a sound understanding of this relationship, emission reduction 
mechanisms have the potential to be over valued and fail to keep emissions within the 
allocated cap. Furthermore, because this system involves trading a valuable right, 
uncertainty over the effects of any mitigating activity casts uncertainty over the monetary 
value. Because the system involves both trading a potentially valuable right, as well as 
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the distribution of potentially ecologically harmful concentrations, it is important that 
estimation methodologies used to calculate emissions are robust, consistent, and 
standardized in order to be defensible from a scientific and regulatory perspective 
(Selman et al., 2009:13). 
   
Second, as NTPs use a discrete number of test sites to monitor the aggregate emissions 
throughout the watershed, it is important to understand the geophysical dynamics of 
pollutant transportation in order to understand how these monitoring points may vary 
from other areas of the watershed (Prabodanie & Raffensperger, 2009).  Of particular 
importance are localised concentrations of pollutants which can occur in discrete parts of 
the watershed even while the emissions levels of the watershed as a whole remain below 
the cap set by the NTP.  These „hot spots‟ occur as a result of a disproportionate 
geographic concentration of polluters in one area of the watershed that either existed 
prior to the NTP or formed as a result of emission rights trading (Nash & Revesz, 
2002:331). The failure to predict such hot spots is accredited for the failure of the first 
ever NTP programme (Woodward et al., 2002:977) 
   
The complexity of the hydrological system in which an NTP is being implemented 
critically affects its ability to accurately account for either of these dynamics.  Spatial 
variations in soil, topographic, hydrologic, geologic and landscape features all pose 
significant challenges (Qiu & Prato, 1999).   It is also dependent on the nature of the 
water body to which it is being applied. NTP can be applied to lakes, ocean, rivers, and 
groundwater, or any mix of the four. However because of the different characteristics of 
all four, they each pose discrete complexities to NTPs. Rivers and groundwater are 
particularly complex as their flow and interaction makes it particularly difficult to 
determine nutrient loads. Thus a robust understanding of the water body on which it is 
being applied is as important as that of the way in which nutrients will reach it.   
 
4.5 Social and Political  
As a result of the democratic context in which resources are managed in Selwyn District, 
the success of any policy is dependent on the social and political support it receives.  
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Without appropriate buy-in, an NTP could not only lack the necessary support to see it 
implemented, it could also lack the necessary commitment to see it properly 
administered. There are two key factors that have proven to influence the support for 
NTPs. 
 
One important factor is the level to which the general public understands the NTP 
approach. As Selman et al. (2009:15) note, misconceptions resulting from a lack of 
understanding about the objectives of an NTP often create social and political tensions 
during their development and implementation.  These tensions can result in both the 
failure to adopt this approach and the failure to successfully implement this approach if in 
fact it is adopted. To avoid such a scenario requires that all stakeholders, regulators, 
polluters and the general public have a clear understanding of not only the NTP process, 
but the benefits and drawbacks of the approach. Familiarity with MBIs in general has 
been shown to be an important determinant of the existence of this necessary 
understanding (Markandya, 1998:27). Previous exposure or use of MBI in the wider 
resources management context is important to ensuring this familiarity.  
   
Another important factor is the political will which exists for deviating from the status 
quo. As with any new policy, NTP will change the current distribution of rights and 
resources, creating both winners and losers. Its viability is therefore dependent on the 
extent to which the affected parties are represented by decision makers (Selman et al., 
2009:2). Because existing resource users are typically over represented in democratic 
processes, their buy in is particularly important (Selman et al., 2009:2; Sinner, Palmer, 
Fenemor, Baines, & Crengle, 2005:14).  It is important to understand the concerns of the 
affected parties, as well as the political context in which these concerns are mobilized in 
order to determine whether an NTP will generate the necessary political support to see it 
successfully implemented. 
   
4.6 Summary  
As this chapter demonstrates, there are a number of important variables that impact on 
the viability of an NTP in any given watershed.  Because of the potential costs, both 
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monetary and ecologic, of a failed NTP, it is important that these variables be properly 
assessed in any watershed prior to moving forward with an NTP approach.  Figure 4.1 
provides a summary of these variables. The following chapter will take this assessment 
framework and apply it to the Selwyn District of Canterbury.  
Table 4.1 Framework for Assessment 
Category Variable Description 
Legal & Intuitional Existing legal rights system 
 
 
Organisational jurisdiction 
 
Organisational capacity 
 Does the existing legal rights system 
accommodate a market in water pollution 
permits? 
 Is there a clear delineation of responsibilities 
within the various relevant authorities? 
 Is there adequate capacity within the 
responsible authorities? 
Economic Abatement cost heterogeneity 
 
 
Market thickness 
 
Transaction costs 
 Is there enough heterogeneity in polluter‟s 
abatement costs to allow for gains to be made 
through trade? 
 Are there enough polluters to ensure adequate 
liquidity in the market? 
 Can transaction costs be appropriately 
managed? 
Biophysical Nutrient loss and transport 
 
 
 Is there adequate and proven modelling 
capacity of the watershed to ensure 
uncertainty is kept to an acceptable level? 
Social & Political Understanding 
 
Political will 
 Is there adequate understanding of the NTP 
approach? 
 Is there adequate political will to alter current 
distributions of rights and resources? 
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Chapter 5 Evaluation of Selwyn District 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Despite being a straight forward process in theory, as demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, there are a number of factors which can play a significant role in determining the 
viability of an NTP. As the nature of these factors will change from context to context, it 
is important that prior to the moving forward with an NTP the local conditions be first 
assessed. This chapter uses the criteria developed in the previous chapter and applies 
them to Selwyn District to determine the likely viability of an NTP there. 
 
5.2 Institutional and Legal 
As discussed previously the viability of an NTP is very much dependent on its ability to 
operate within the existing institutional and legal frameworks. The Resource 
Management Act 1991 (RMA) sets the institutional and legal framework for freshwater 
management in New Zealand and is administered by the Ministry for the Environment. 
As Sharp (2002) points out, despite the unitary system of government in New Zealand, 
when it comes to environmental policy and the RMA, New Zealand shares some of the 
jurisdictional complexities usually associated with federal systems such as those of 
Canada and the United States. 
 
Freshwater management in Selwyn District is subject to the general planning provisions 
of the RMA through a hierarchy of documents from national to regional to district level. 
As a result despite water quality management being the primary responsibility of regional 
governments, in this case Environment Canterbury, their relevant statutes vis a vis the 
Resource Management Act and Local Government Act does limit their decision-making 
capacity regarding the management approach undertaken (Sharp, 2002:53). However in 
the absence of national policy guidance on freshwater management, regional level policy 
documents have provided the main freshwater management framework. Through these 
Regional Policy Statements (RPS) Regional Councils do have the authority to establish 
the water quality standards essential to the NTP approach.  
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The legality of the NTP approach in New Zealand is also clear. Sharp (2002) shows that 
MBIs are given provision under section 5 of the RMA. In fact the RMA requires that 
economic instruments be considered at both the national as well as regional and local 
levels as potential instruments to achieve the purpose of the Act. This conclusion is 
further supported by its current use on the North Island. Waikato Regional Plan variation 
5 has successfully demonstrated the use emission trading approach under the RMA to 
counter the pollution problem in the Lake Taupo catchment (Rutherford & Cox, 
2009:13).  
 
There does however appear to be a significant capacity deficit at lower levels of 
government. A 2010 review of Environment Canterbury by a group of some of New 
Zealand‟s most experienced assessors of organisational capability found a significant gap 
between water management needs in the region and Environment Canterbury‟s capacity 
to carry them out (Creech et al., 2010).  This review concluded that Environment 
Canterbury‟s capacity on water policy, including water quality management, falls well 
short of what is essential (Creech et al., 2010). This capacity deficit could be critical in 
determining its viability given that the NTP approach requires significant resourcing in its 
infancy. 
 
5.3 Economic 
Appropriate economic conditions are important for ensuring that adequate incentive 
exists for polluters to voluntarily participate in an NTP. Abatement costs heterogeneity, 
market thickness and transaction costs are three important variables affecting this 
condition.    
 
There are two factors affecting a polluter‟s abatement cost: the impact that any abatement 
effort will have on their emissions; and the economic costs associated with that action. 
Despite Selwyn District being a relatively small geographic area, weather stations 
scattered throughout the District show the existence of a number of microclimates. For 
example, Darfield receives on average 68% more rain than Lincoln in a year (Cross, 
Dalziel & Saunders, 2004:25-26). Such variations in precipitation have been shown 
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significant impact on levels emissions transported off a paddock. There are also a number 
of different types of soil and a range of slopes through Selwyn District (Cross et al., 
2004:21), each of which has a specific impact on mitigation efforts. As demonstrated in 
Waikato, this variation can have a significant impact on the abatement costs 
heterogeneity (Ramilan & Scrimgeour, 2006).  
  
Abatement costs are also dependent on the polluter production cost function. Table 5.1 
provides a breakdown of the types of farming conducted in Selwyn District. It highlights 
25 different types of farm. While the production functions for each type are not known, it 
is reasonable to assume that amongst this wide range of farming types there is likely to be 
some diversity in costs structure. Ramilan and Scrimgeour (2006) also highlight that the 
nature of this heterogeneity is likely to change relative the specific abatement level 
sought. The implications of this are that as the cap evolves there is likely to be a continual 
incentive to trade credits and therefore ensure economic efficiency over the longer therm.  
Table 5.1 Break-down of Selwyn District Farming 
Farm Type Number of Farms % of Total Farms 
Sheep Farming 500 22.7 
Beef Cattle Farming 290 13.2 
Horse Farming 180 8.2 
Dairy Cattle Faring 170 7.7 
Deer Farming 100 4.5 
Grain-Sheep and Grain-Beef Cattle Farming 60 2.7 
Sheep-Beef Cattle Farming 60 2.7 
Livestock Farming 50 2.3 
Pig Farming 40 1.8 
Mixed Livestock 40 1.8 
Poultry Farming (Meat) 18 0.8 
Poultry Farming (Eggs) 9 0.4 
 
Vegetable Growing 140 6.4 
Other Fruit Growing 80 3.6 
Plant Nurseries 40 1.8 
Cut Flower and Flower Seed Growing 35 1.6 
Grape Growing 25 1.1 
Apple and Pear Growing 25 1.1 
Berry Fruit Growing 15 0.7 
Kiwi Fruit Growing 3 0.1 
 
Evaluation of Selwyn District 
32 
 
Grain Growing 60 2.7 
Cultivated Mushroom Growing 6 0.3 
Crop and Plant Growing 40 1.8 
Forestry 110 5.0 
Other 35 1.6 
 
Total Farmers 
 
2,200 
 
100 
Source: Cross, Dalziel & Saunders (2004)   
   
 
Market thickness also plays an important role determining NTP success. In an ideal 
market, participants would be able to buy and sell allowances when they wished without 
affecting the market price (Lock & Kerr, 2008:4). As highlighted again in Table 5.1, 
there are 2,200 farms operating in Selwyn District (Cross et al., 2004). Evidence from 
successful Nutrient Trading Programmes in the United States such as that at Chesapeake 
Bay, suggest this is sufficiently large to see the existence of a competitive market in 
nutrient credits (Wiedemand, 2001).  
 
Transaction costs are a third economic factor affecting the viability of an NTP. Central 
market amalgamators are one means which has successfully minimized transaction costs 
in NTPs. Central market amalgamators are agencies that control the trading of shares and 
reduces the effects of bilateral trades on cost effectiveness (Atkinson & Tietenberg, 
1991:28). The feasibility of such an approach in New Zealand has been demonstrated by 
its use in the Lake Rotorua Nutrient Trading Program.  Their effective application in 
Selwyn District has also been demonstrated through local level modelling of various 
emissions trading schemes (Prabodanie & Raffensperger, 2007). 
 
5.4 Biophysical 
A key requirement for the tradability of emissions a permit is the ability to relate a 
polluter‟s management practice to both the emissions from their land and to the impacts 
those emissions have on the water quality downstream. This ability is dependent on the 
capacity to accurately account for both nutrient loss as well as nutrient transport within 
the catchment, which is in turn affected by the geophysical complexity of the watershed.  
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New Zealand‟s AgResearch has developed a nutrient budgeting model to facilitate the 
estimation of nutrient losses from pastoral lands called Overseer (Selman et al., 2009:14; 
Ramilan & Scrimgeour, 2006:5). This model provides users with a tool to examine the 
impact of various management techniques on both production costs as well as leaching 
rates (AgResearch, 2010). In doing this it is able to quantify the emissions reductions of 
various management practices. While Overseer has been shown to offer considerable 
insight into the land management nutrient loss relationship, it has none the less proven to 
remain imperfect (Chichota & Snow, 2008). As a result, there remains uncertainty 
regarding the accuracy of the environmental and economic significance of changes in 
management practices.  
 
The hydrological dynamics of the water shed as a whole also remain a significant 
uncertainty in Selwyn District. Seepage from Rakaia and Waimakariri rivers into Selwyn 
District's watersheds, along with the dynamic and complex interaction existing between 
ground and surface water, blurs the lines between different cause and effect relationships. 
As a result, the ability of an NTP to take into account the possible development of hot 
spots within the watershed is limited. While biophysical uncertainty is a reality for all 
NTPs, the specific conditions of Selwyn District present a particularly significant barrier 
to creating the confidence needed to operationalize an NTP. 
 
5.5 Social and Political 
The social and political context of resource management is a final important variable 
influencing the viability of an NTP. The current social and political context of water 
management in Selwyn District is complex and variable. As a result, the likely impact it 
will have on NTP success is difficult to determine.  
 
There is evidence to suggest a familiarity with MBIs in resource management amongst 
both decision makers and the public. Their high profile application to marine fisheries in 
the 1990‟s is perhaps the most well known, however there exists a wide range of use 
from the auctioning of oil and gas exploration rights to the trading of water takes. While 
its application to water quality is novel in Selwyn District, because of their application to 
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other resource management issues it would be reasonable to expect at least a basic 
familiarity with the principles of the approach.  
 
Despite this general familiarity administrators remain reluctant to embrace MBIs. The 
requirement of their assessment under Section 32 of the RMA does not seem to be 
sufficient incentive for the serious consideration of their application. Sharp (2005:57) 
points out that this is likely the result of the prevailing regulatory culture in regional 
government. Because of both a familiarity and an established process, CAC remains the 
favoured instrument and is often selected without comparative analysis. It is also likely 
related to the limited local capacity highlighted earlier. Already stretched too thin, it is 
not likely that a regulatory organisation will be interested in taking a chance with a novel 
approach unless its effective use is certain to produce significant advantages.  
 
This reluctance by administrators to take on an NTP approach is only worsened by the 
highly charged political context of water management in Canterbury (Lomax, Memon & 
Painter, 2010). Because of the local level administration, local interest groups are likely 
to have a greater impact on decision making. Furthermore, because of the relative size of 
the agricultural sector within the local economy there is likely to be more focussed 
influence because of reduced heterogeneity of interests (Sharp, 2002:39). There is 
however evidence that this may be changing.  A recent review of the Canterbury Water 
Management Strategy suggests that it has been successful in laying a broad strategic 
foundation for reaching agreement on contentious water issues. However it also 
highlights that while this progress is significant, it remains a fragile process (Lomax, 
Memon & Painter, 2010). 
 
5.6 Summary 
Figure 5.2 provides a summary of the findings highlighted above as they related to the 
evaluation criteria developed in chapter four. While there is a clear lack of capacity to 
implement an NTP and there remains some uncertainty surrounding the accuracy of 
current biophysical modelling as well as a fair bit of political volatility the remaining six 
variables seem to be well supported. In order to build a more conclusive picture of the 
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significance of these observations, the following chapter will discuss these findings in 
context of recommended future steps.  
 
Table 5.2 Assessment results 
Category Description Finding 
Legal & 
Intuitional 
 Does the existing legal rights system accommodate a market in 
water pollution permits? 
 Is there a clear delineation of responsibilities within the various 
relevant authorities? 
 Is there adequate capacity within the responsible authorities? 
 Yes 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
Economic  Is there enough heterogeneity in polluter‟s abatement costs to 
allow for gains to be made through trade? 
 Are there enough polluters to ensure adequate liquidity in the 
market? 
 Can transaction costs be appropriately managed? 
 Yes 
 
 Likely 
 
 Likely 
Biophysical  Is there adequate and proven modelling capacity of the watershed 
to ensure uncertainty is kept to an acceptable level? 
 
 Uncertain 
 
Social & 
Political 
 Is there adequate understanding of the NTP approach? 
 Is there adequate political will to alter current distributions of 
rights and resources? 
 Yes 
 Uncertain 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous analysis highlights some mixed results regarding the viability of an NTP in 
Selwyn District. While some variables clearly support an NTP, the state of others remains 
uncertain. This chapter will discus these findings and make recommendations regarding 
moving forward with an NTP in Selwyn District. It will also highlight a few areas in 
which future research could add significant value to existing understandings.  
 
6.2 Recommendations 
The recommendations draw on the findings from the previous chapter and are intended to 
direct efforts to NTPs in Selwyn District.  
 
6.2.1 Build Local Capacity 
While water quality management in Selwyn District is subject to a hierarchy of 
jurisdiction as laid out in the RMA, because of the absence of national level direction, 
responsibility is clearly understood to rest with Environment Canterbury. The current 
application of NTPs to the water quality management in at least two watersheds in New 
Zealand clearly demonstrates its legality. Both of these findings offer strong support for 
the possibility of an NTP to operate within the legal and institutional framework of New 
Zealand‟s fresh water management.  
 
Despite this clear demonstration of its possibility, due to a lack of resources at the 
regional and local levels its feasibility is less clear. This lack of capacity calls into 
question the ability of regional and local councils to develop and implement an NTP and 
their ability to provide the necessary monitoring and enforcement to see the system 
operate effectively.  NTP viability is limited without this capacity. 
 
Despite this observed weakness at the local level, there is a demonstrated strength at the 
national level as well as within other regions. The successful implementation of an NTP 
in both the Lake Taupo and Lake Rotarua watersheds suggests that it is possible for the 
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necessary capacity to exist at the regional and local levels.  Unlike many other factors 
affecting the viability of an NTP, institutional conditions have the potential to be changed 
through targeted efforts. Rather than a permanent impediment to NTP use, this capacity 
deficit can be viewed as an indication of where effort should be focused prior to NTP 
development.  Given the recent uncertainty regarding the organisational structure of 
Environment Canterbury and the proposed development of a separate water management 
body, there is considerable opportunity for this capacity to evolve in a short period of 
time.   
 
In order to ensure that this capacity is built it is recommended that efforts be targeted on 
learning from existing national level expertise, as well as from other local level expertise.  
While resourcing is also a fundamental component of capacity, developing a better local 
understanding of the administrative requirements of an NTP would help inform and 
justify future resourcing efforts. Learning from regional and local councils which have 
already implemented NTPs under similar organisational constraints is therefore 
fundamental.  
 
6.2.2 Develop Experienced Understanding 
The above analysis finds that the economic prerequisites of an NTP are currently met 
within Selwyn District. Evidence on abatement costs heterogeneity, market thickness and 
transaction costs all suggest that an NTP will offer the potential economic gains needed 
to encourage emitters to participate in voluntary exchange under a cap. However, unlike 
other variables, economic conditions can be significantly altered by the design of the 
NTP. Therefore while these preliminary findings are positive and should not be 
discounted, there needs to be sufficient attention paid to the design and implementation of 
the NTP to ensure these conditions are optimized.  
 
One aspect which needs to be considered is the scope of polluters included under an NTP. 
The scope can range from including only one specific type of nutrient emmiter, such as 
dairy farmers, to including all possible sources. Previous NTP experience has 
demonstrated that while the flexibility and efficiency of the system will increase with the 
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more polluters the policy covers, so too will the administrative costs (Lock & Kerr, 
2008:5). Therefore, because any gains expected to come from this more insclusive 
structure are subject to higher transaction costs, it is recommended that there is a carful 
consideration of the cost and benefit of alternative scopes. 
 
A second important design consideration with respect to ensuring that adequate economic 
incentives persist is the mechanism through which emissions credits are exchanged. 
Online market amalgamators have demonstrated success in reducing transaction costs in 
a number of settings including in Selwyn District. However the structure that creates the 
most efficient market may not provide the highest certainty that environmental targets 
will be reached. Therefore, there must be a conscious and well justified evaluation of the 
tradeoffs.  
 
While there is a lot to be learned from how NTPs elsewhere have addressed these trade 
offs, because of the importance of local conditions on all aspects of the market structure it 
is recommended that any NTP development in Selwyn focus on building from local 
understandings. In order to do this localised pilot sights should be run to test alternative 
market structures.  Lessons learned from these small scale applications can then be drawn 
on to inform structuring these trade offs at the catchment level.  
 
6.2.3 Minimize than Mitigate Uncertainty 
Geophysical uncertainty presents the most significant challenge to the viability of an NTP 
in Selwyn District. The complexity of interaction amongst water bodies in the watershed 
limits the accuracy of both emissions and transport modelling. This uncertainty can have 
a considerable impact on the economic and ecological confidence of the system.  
 
Though varying in degree, this uncertainty is a condition facing all NTPs throughout the 
world.  This uncertainty is most commonly internalised into the trade by building trading 
ratios into all emissions credit transactions. Rather than allowing one to one trading, a 
polluter must purchase more credit than that which is being sold. For example in order to 
increase ones emissions by 10 units, 12 units would need to be purchased from other 
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emitters. Such trading ratios are particularly important with regard to new and innovative 
mitigation measures as their true value has often not yet been fully demonstrated. 
Therefore as they gain acceptance and develop a degree of scientific certainty, the trading 
ratio they are subject to can be reduced. While these trading ratios help address some of 
the ecological uncertainty, they do increase transaction costs. Therefore, once again level 
of ecological certainty needs to be measured against the economic cost of achieving it. 
Furthermore, not all types of trades have the same level of uncertainty and therefore 
should not all be subject to the same ratio.  
 
In order to achieve the optimal environmental and economic outcomes it is recommended 
that the NTP mechanism include a classification of uncertainty based on the location of 
the polluters, the type of emissions they are discharging and the abatement measures they 
are introducing. To do this will require further development of the current modelling 
capacity in the District. It will also, however, require building more localized 
understandings of the various biophysical characteristics throughout the watershed and 
their likely affects on emissions and transportation. New Zealand‟s National Institute of 
Water and Atmospheric Research is already conducting similar localized testing (NIWA, 
2010), however in order to meet the needs of a District wide NTP these efforts will need 
to be better resourced and more widely applied.  
 
6.2.4 Build on Participatory Framework 
Familiarity with MBIs might suggest a certain level of social and political acceptance 
with the approach, however because of the politically charged nature of water 
management in Selwyn District such familiarity does not necessary translate into its 
desirability. Because an NTP will change the current distribution of rights and resources 
it is inevitable that there will be some political aversion. Given the traditionally 
adversarial approach to resource decision making in the district the effects of this 
aversion could be significant.  
 
There is also, however, emerging evidence that this may be changing. With a new 
organisational structure and associated mandate at the regional level as well as with the 
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emergence of a new participatory approach to water management decisions, there is 
reason to believe that positive change can occur. As Atkinson and Tietenberg (1990:30) 
point out, it must also be recognized that virtually all regulatory reform goes through 
stages. Through these stage expectations and beliefs will fluctuate. Therefore it is 
important that any effort to develop and implement an NTP recognizes this volatility in 
the political and social landscape and that these efforts take a long term perspective and 
see beyond the problem of the day and seek lasting substantive solutions.  
 
With the long run in mind it is recommended that any development of an NTP work 
within the emerging participatory framework. The value of such an approach has been 
previously demonstrated in New Zealand through the ITQ process which established 
early collaboration between government official and industry representatives to allow for 
concerns from all stakeholders to be heard and considered in the design (Sinner et al., 
2005:5).  
 
It is also recommended that an NTP be implemented through a series of limited duration, 
limited geographic extent pilot projects. Not only does this build on previous 
recommendations but such an approach can reduce the perceived threat of changes by 
allowing individuals to gain some degree of comfort with the production modification 
required before there are serious sanctions for non-compliance. They also allow for a 
greater familiarity with the mechanism to develop prior to any real costs or consequences 
being enforced. This familiarisation will not only help the polluters adjust, but will also 
help the local council develop a better understanding of the programme and its 
requirements.  
 
6.3 Future Research Directions 
In providing a preliminary overview of the likely challenges an NTP will face in Selwyn 
District, this dissertation also highlights some areas in which more research is needed. 
The following draws on these and makes specific recommendations for future research in 
the field. 
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6.3.1 Establishing Potential Economic Gains 
While this dissertation concluded that economic conditions were conducive for an NTP, 
the analysis could none the less benefit from a more focused survey of abatement cost 
heterogeneity within the district. This work would provide a more definitive 
quantification of the likely economic gains to arise for the mechanism and would 
therefore help build the political will for such a system as well as to reduce some of the 
uncertainty held by the practitioners responsible for its implementation.  
 
6.3.2 Determining a Cap  
Currently there is limited understanding of what a nutrient cap in the district might look 
like. This requires not only a better understanding of the ecological thresholds but also 
the social and cultural preferences. Developing a better understanding of what a cap 
might look like and building an evidence base around it will increase the social 
acceptance and political will needed for an NTP to contribute to water quality 
management goals.  
 
6.3.3 Targeted Hydrological Modelling 
While modelling will never eliminate uncertainty and this field of knowledge is likely to 
be one that continues to evolve, there needs to be a more concentrated effort to look at the 
current biophisical understandings and how they relate to the needs of an NTP. This 
means more targeted research on the specific modelling needs of an NTP. This involves 
taking a better account of the limitations to the current modelling, noting the impacts that 
these limitaiton have on the system and then focusing efforts on addressing these. This 
would include a better understanding of differences in uncertainty within the watershed. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The analysis conducted here highlights the overall viability of an NTP in Selwyn District. 
Legal, economic and social conditions are all conducive to its adoption. While 
institutional, biophysical and political factors do highlight some potential obstacles, there 
is sufficient evidence from NTPs elsewhere that through the execution of the 
recommendations provided here, these obstacles can be successfully overcome.  
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Despite demonstrating the viability of an NTP in Selwyn, this analysis does not 
necessarily imply its desirability. While it has demonstrated a suite of potential economic, 
ecological and political benefits associated with the approach, the ultimate decision about 
its adoption should remain to be determined by those affected, the people of Selwyn 
District. Neutering the emerging participatory approach to resource management should 
therefore be a fundamental goal of Selwyn District, regardless of whether an NTP is 
adopted.   
 
It should also be noted that the successful adoption of an NTP will not necessarily be a 
fast process. Because of the effects of local conditions, every NTP needs to be catered to 
its context. As a result the success of an NTP in Selwyn will in part depend on its ability 
to internalize lessons over time. It would be wise for process of implementation to 
therefore be designed with this in mind. Starting with small scale localized deployment 
before moving to larger more consequential applications.  
 
NTP success will also depend on its effective integration within the larger resource 
management framework. Despite being a new tool, it none the less needs to become part 
of a larger tool box. Viewing NTPs a stand alone solution will likely result in grave 
disappointment. It needs to be understood by all stokeholds that NTPs need to be but one 
component of a larger integrated solution.  
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